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in California, rather than a specially convened court, would be
better able, in the first instance, to investigate complaints against
judges. If the charges stated in the complaint appear to have a
reasonable basis, then upon the request of the commission, a court
on the judiciary could be convened to try the merits of the case
and reach a determination. In addition, provision could be made
for removal of the cause to the legislature for the purpose of the
initiation of impeachment proceedings.
It is submitted that the promulgation of such a constitutional
amendment dealing with judicial removal is the preferred solution
to the many problems brought to light by the instant case.

CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENDANT NOT ALLOWED CREDIT FOR
TIME SERVED UNDER VOID CONVICTION IF SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED OF SAME OFFENSE. -Because
the trial court lacked juris-

diction, petitioner's felony conviction was held void, and he was
released on a writ of habeas corpus after serving one and a half
years of his original sentence. Thereafter, he was retried for the same
crime, and was validly convicted and sentenced once more to serve
from one to three years. On appeal, the question before the reviewing
court was whether the time served under his former sentence should
be applied to his present term. By stipulation, it was agreed that if
previous time served was ruled applicable to his present sentence,
the petitioner was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that credit may not be given for a term
served under a void conviction, as distinguished from a prior invalid
sentence, if the petitioner is subsequently validly convicted of the
same offense. Morgan v. Cox, 75 N.M. 472, 406 P.2d 347 (1965).
An analysis of the background against which the decision in the
instant case was reached reveals little uniformity among the several
states in their respective approaches to the problem of the felon who
has served a portion of a prison term under a prior void conviction
or invalid sentence and is subsequently validly convicted or sentenced
for the same crime. However, a study of the varying decisions
and statutory solutions adopted by different jurisdictions serves to
awaken increased interest and sympathy for the plight of prisoners
who have served time in excess of the maximum penalty established
by the legislature for their crimes simply because they have "successfully" challenged their original convictions and obtained new
trials.
With respect to jurisdictions applying the common-law approach
to this problem, the differing positions may be divided into three
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basic categories.1 In the first category are those states which refuse
credit for time served under either former void convictions or void
sentences. In one Illinois decision, 2 for example, the first sentence
was imposed under a statute which was declared unconstitutional,
thereby rendering the sentence void. Nonetheless, the appellate
court later sustained a second valid sentence, allowing the plaintiff
in error no credit for the time already served, holding that the court
lacked power to do so. Illinois courts have repeatedly refused to
abandon this strict position,3 deciding in another case that, "we do
not make laws, but are authorized only to interpret them." 4 Thus,
in Illinois, the crediting of time already served under a former
void conviction or sentence is considered an undue infringement
on the executive branch's power to pardon or parole.5
The second category represents a more liberal view toward the
re-sentencing problem, inasmuch as it allows credit for time served
under an invalid sentence, although continuing to deny credit for
time served under a prior void conviction.0 There are two separate
lines of reasoning supporting this approach.7 Some states hold
that seeking a new trial constitutes a waiver of the consequences
of the petitioner's previous conviction.8 For example, in State ex
rel. Lopea v. Killigrew,9 an Indiana court concluded that the defendant, by requesting and obtaining a coram nobis proceeding,
accepted any legal consequences which resulted from treating the
first trial as if it had never taken place. 10 Moreover, it was held
that the second trial would not subject the defendant to double
I For a general summary of the various positions see Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 449-50, 108 N.E.2d 922, 924-25 (1952); Annot., 35
A.L.R.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1953). For a summary of positions taken by the
various jursidictions concerning the consequences of a void conviction see Van
Alstyne, It Gideoi's Wake: Harsher Penalties And The "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE LEJ. 606, 610 (1965).
2 People ex rel. Boyle v. Ragen, 400 Ill. 571, 81 N.E.2d 444 (1948).
3 People v. Williams, 404 Ill. 624, 89 N.E.2d 822 (1950) ; People v. Wilson, 391 Ill. 463, 63 N.E.2d 488 (1945).
4Supra note 2, at 573, 81 N.F_.2d at 445.
5 People v. Wilson, sutpra note 3, at 468, 63 N.E2d at 491; see People v.
Starks, 395 Ill. 567, 71 N.E.2d 23 (1947), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (194).
6In Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 760, 764, 220 S.W. 1045, 1046
(1920), the court stated that "it would be an injustice, as well as flagrant
invasion of their legal rights, to require them to serve their terms, or any
part thereof, twice."
7 Whalen, Jr., Resentence Without Credit For Time Served: Unequal
Protection Of The Laws, 35 MiNN. L. REv. 239, 240 (1951).
s g., Commonwealth v.Murphy, 174 Mass. 369, 371, 54 N.E. 860, 861
(1899). The United States Supreme Court upheld the "waiver" theory in
Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905).
:202 Ind. 392, 174 N.E. 808 (1931).
10 But note, Indiana statute permits the trial court to correct retroactively
the imposed sentence when itappears that the defendant has previously served
under an erroneous sentence. IND. ANN. STAT. Rule 2-40B (Supp. 1965).
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jeopardy because the purpose of the constitutional prohibition was
to restrict the power of the state for the protection of the accused,
and, therefore, the defendant himself might constitutionally waive
that protection."
The other line of reasoning is based on the
separation of powers doctrine. Thus, it is argued that the legislature
alone has the power to fix the term of punishment, 12 and that
commutation of the sentence is solely within the pardoning powers
of the executive.' 3 Several midwestern states, such as Wisconsin,'"
have adopted this position with respect to void convictions.
At least one jurisdiction, Florida, illustrates a third category
which allows credit regardless of whether the time has been served
under either an invalid sentence or a void conviction.' 5 This
position rests entirely on the grounds of fairness and equity. It
is exemplified by the holding in Helton v. Mayo, 0 that credit
should be allowed or "otherwise the petitioner would be done a
grave injustice." '1
In the absence of statute, the modern view is to give credit to
the prisoner who has served time under a void sentence, although a
majority of common-law jurisdictions still refuse this concession
to a defendant who has served under a prior void conviction.' 8
Societal concern with the treatment of those whose prior
sentence or conviction is void is illustrated by a recent growth in
the number of statutes in the area. By 1950, three states had
enacted statutes which required that time served under a void
conviction be credited to the prisoner on his new conviction for
the same offense.'0 At present, a total of nine states, including
New -York,- have adopted similar statutes.20 However, it should.
"'It should be noted that these prohibitions are found in state constitutions. In Indiana, the prohibition against double jeopardy is found in IND.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 14. But even in the absence of a specific provision in the
state constitution, the common-law rule against double jeopardy is frequently
adopted as a part of procedural due process. E.g., Kohlfuss v. State, 149
Conn. 692, 695, 183 A.2d 626, 627 (1962). The fifth amendment prohibition
in the federal constitution is not, at present, a feature of procedural due
process under the fourteenth amendment. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 609
n.11.
'12See State v. Woodward, 68 W.Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385 (1910).
13 See Ogle v. State, 43 Tex.. Crim. 219, 63 S.W. 1009 (1901).
14 State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N.W.2d 540
(1946) (dictum).
15See Vellucci v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1962).
16 153 Fla. 616, 15 So. 2d 416 (1943).
17 Ibid.
18 Supra note 1.
19ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2728 (1947); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 2900.1; IowA
CODE
ANN. § 793.26 (1950).
20
The six additional states include: ICY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 197.041
(1962); Micr. STAT." ANN. §'28.1083 (supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.145 (1963); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2193(4); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 29-28-34
(1960) ; WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.95.063 (1965).
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also be noted that Montana has passed a statute interpreted as
prohibiting the crediting of such time to the subsequent sentence. 21
Thus, legislators have not exerted a consistently liberalizing force
in this field.
The growth in the number of statutes dealing with this problem
has been partially inspired by pressure from the judiciary; such
was the case in New York. Prior to the statute in that state, a New
York court, in People v. Ashworth,22 criticized the common-law
rule which denied credit for years served under a void conviction.
The court urged, as had previous courts, that the legislature consider
appropriate amendments to the existing statutes, which would vest
the courts with the necessary authority to credit for time served.
The common-law rule was superceded by the legislature in 1960.
As a consequence, the crediting of time served under a void conviction is now a mandatory requirement in New York State.23 This
enactment places a prisoner, who has served under a void conviction,
on a par with one who has served under an invalid sentence.
It has been suggested that the underlying reason for refusing
to credit a prisoner with time served is to discourage frivolous
appeals lest they needlessly overwhelm the appellate courts.24

Pro-

ponents argue that the existence of such a harsh rule discourages
those petitions
for retrial which offer little prospect of a subsequent
25
acquittal.

Perhaps another causal factor is a possible anticipatory defensive
reaction to a threatened raising of the double jeopardy issue if2 6the
court were to accord the first conviction any validity whatever.
The precise issue of allowing credit for time served under a
void conviction has repeatedly been called to the attention of the
United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari, but, as yet,
there has been no decision by that tribunal directly bearing on the
problem. The unconstitutionality of failure to credit a prisoner
with time served under a former void conviction for the same
offense has been asserted under several differing grounds. One
approach takes the position that this practice violates the equal
21
MON. REv.
(Mont. 1962).

CoD.

§ 94-7602 (1947).

State v. Ellsworth, 375 P.2d 316

2256 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1945); see also People ex rel. Montana v.
McGee, 171 Misc. 533, 16 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
23 N.Y. Pz. I. LAW § 2193(4).
24 Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction - A
Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 24 MONT. L. R~v. 3, 21 (1963); Whalen,
Jr., supra note 7, at 248.
25 See Note, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 855, 862-64 (1949).
26 Whalen, Jr., supra note 7, at 243-44. If the court were to accord the
first conviction any validity whatever, a second trial would be prohibited.
Cf. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1874); see generally
Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HAv. L. Rzv. 1272
(1964).
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2' Arguments on
the basis of double jeopardy have also been propounded, but they
have not succeeded in the federal courts.2 8 Disappointment at the
lack of success of the latter arguments has prompted one author to
express his belief that unless individual states remedy the situation,
at least to the extent of limiting any sentence on reconviction to
the maximum received for the same offense at the former trial,
the United States Supreme Court will correct the situation through
an application of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 29 It has also
been contended that refusal to credit time served under a prior
30
void conviction constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.
Although, in general, the eighth amendment restricts the form of
31
punishment rather than its duration,
if the punishment is not in
proportion to the offense in either form or duration, its constitutionality is highly questionable. 32 It is, of course, the excessive
duration which forms the basis for a constitutional objection under
this theory.
Two out-of-state decisions primarily relied upon by the Court
33
in deciding the instant case were State ex rel. Drankovichv. Murphy
4
and Ex parte Wilkerson. In Drankovich, the reviewing Wisconsin
court held that any previous time served should not be taken into
consideration by the trial court because that tribunal lacked any
discretion in the matter. The court in Drankovich proposed, as an
alternative remedy, that the prisoner in this predicament might
apply to the governor for a pardon. That court did not feel its
decision was inequitable because the prisoner had been fully advised
as to the consequences of a new trial before he appealed.3 5 In
Wilkerson, the Oklahoma court noted the lack of any statutory
authority to grant credit for time served under a former void
conviction, and, in addition, it sharply criticized an earlier decision36
which had granted credit for time served by a defendant imprisoned
during the pendency of his appeal. The Oklahoma court suggested,
as in the Drankovich case,3 7 that the prisoner's sole remedy was to
27

Whalen, Jr., supra note 7, at 251; contra, Beach v. Commonwealth, 282

S.W.2d
821 (Ky. 1955).
28

Whalen, Jr., supra note 7, at 243-44. See also Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919).
29 Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 624.
30 See generally Whalen, Jr., Punishment For Crime: The Supreme Court
And31 The Constitution, 35 MINx. L. REv. 109, 111-22 (1951).
Note, Cruel and Unusual Panishments, 34 CAT~ouc U.L. REv. 117, 118

(1953).

32 Id. at 121; see generally Beckett, Criminal Penalties in Oregon, 40
Om.3 L. REv. 1, 13-40 (1960).
sSupra note 14.
34
3 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943).

5Supra note 14, at 440, 22 N.W.2d at 543.
Ex parte Williams, 63 Okla. Crim. 395, 75 P2d 904 (1938).
37 Supra note 14.
36
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appeal for executive clemency, citing the state constitution for
Wilkerson further held that
authority conferring this power.
the time already served under a void conviction was not execution
of a legal sentence; hence, the subsequent imposition of a valid
sentence did not constitute punishment twice imposed for the
identical offense.
The Court in the instant case recognized that the situation
presented was comparable to that of a prisoner seeking credit for
time served while his appeal is pending.39 In 1963, this same New
Mexico Court had held that it was proper for the trial court, in its
discretion, to permit the effective period of incarceration to run
from the date of the sentencing itself so as to give a prisoner the
benefit of time served while his appeal was pending.40 This conclusion was reached despite the fact that, in effect, it shortened
the time to be served. Thus, if a prisoner has been validly convicted and sentenced and he appeals this conviction unsuccessfully,
the time served while the appeal is pending could be credited to
his present term. Moreover, in another decision, the Court held
that if the prisoner's sentence was found to be invalid, then he
would be credited with the time already served when he was
subsequently validly re-sentenced. 41 However, that decision involved a prisoner who had been validly convicted, the defect being
in his sentence alone. The basic difference between that decision
and the case at bar is the fact that in the instant case the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to validly convict the petitioner.
Finding the original conviction invalid, the instant Court proceeded on the theory that the first trial was a nullity, and that
even its consequence, viz., the period of the prisoner's imprisonment, had been completely blotted from the legal record. Pursuing
this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the Court determined that
credit for the petitioner's time served under his void conviction
could not be applied to his present term.
Just prior to this decision, in Floyd V. Cox, 42 this Court,
following the authority of Sneed v. CoX, 43 had permitted time served
under a prior void conviction to be credited to a prisoner, analogizing
it to time served under a previous invalid sentence. At that time,
it had appeared that the developing New Mexico case law was
following the liberal example set by the state of Florida.
However, the Court in the instant case concluded that Floyd
had been improperly decided. In so deciding, the Court took a
§ 10 (1907).
Morgan v. Cox, 75 N.M. 472, -, 406 P.2d 347, 348 (1965).
40 State v. White, 71 N.M. 342, 378 P.2d 379 (1963) (dictum).
41 Sneed v. Cox, 74 N.L. 659, 397 P.2d 308 (1964). See also McCutcheon
v. Cox, 71 N.M. 274, 377 P.2d 683 (1962).
42 Cited in Morgan v. Cox, supra note, 39, at -, 406 P.2d at 348.
43 Sneed v. Cox, supra note 41.
38 OKLA. CONST. art. 6,

30
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step backward, establishing that in the future New Mexico would
follow its earlier, more conservative precedent"4 in this difficult
and controversial area. It is to be noted that in reinstating older
rules and repudiating a liberal precedent such as Floyd, the decision,
while admittedly settling the law in New Mexico on this point,
also arouses some doubts as to the justification for such a seemingly
harsh result. This observation seems especially appropriate in the
light of the current liberal statutory trend with respect to this
problem among the several states.45
As previously noted, the discouragement of appeals is seen by
some authorities as a necessity to promote the efficient functioning
of appellate courts. Unfortunately, this reasoning, however meritorious its objective, would seem unlikely to foster fairness in
the administration of the criminal law. Certainly, it would appear
that a prisoner should not suffer additional penalties for insisting
upon his rights to a new trial, if a substantial defect existed which
rendered his first trial a nullity.
That the consequences of obtaining a new trial can often be
harsh is evident from current judicial practices, whereby prisoners
who succeed in obtaining new trials can receive substantially more
severe sentences at46their second trial, such sentences being frequently
upheld on appeal.
An analysis of the reasoning which typically supports the
refusal to credit a prisoner with time served under a prior void
conviction suggests patent injustice. Criticizing the practice of
simply ignoring such time served, because all subsequent occurrences
under a prior void conviction are considered legally non-existent,
one judge remarked, "The government's brief suggests in the vein
of the Mikado that because the first sentence was void appellant
'has served no sentence but has merely spent time in the penihave been imprisoned as he
tentiary', and that since he should not
47
was, he was not imprisoned at all."
Moreover, the theory that a petitioner asserting the invalidity
of a former trial thereby "waives" all rights resulting thereunder
is equally inapposite. To be operative, a "waiver" of this nature
must be untainted by coercion. Clearly, any other interpretation
of "waiver" merits no place in an enlightened jurisprudence.
While the arguments which underlie the rule of this case seem
ill-founded, attempts to moderate the inherent harshness of this
44 Jordan v. Swope, 36 N.M. 84, 8 P.2d 788 (1932).
45 See statutes cited, notes 19 & 20 supra.
46 State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964). In another
case, a defendant had been sentenced to life imprisonment at the first trial;
he received the death penalty at the second. State v. Kneeskern, 203 Iowa
929, 953, 210 N.W. 465, 473 (1926).
47 King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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type of result are, unfortunately, often ineffectual. The pardoning
power, often suggested as an ameliorating force in this area, is
usually vested solely in the governor of the state. Beset with many
responsibilities in addition to the exercise of this power, a governor
might find it difficult to strike a proper and judicious balance in its
use. Another consideration is the inefficiency which must necessarily result from the exercise of the pardoning power on an ad hoc
basis.
It is therefore submitted that the most effective remedy for this
problem would take the form of statutory enactment. Legislation
would not only provide a precise and definite solution, but an
imperative one as well. Continued legislative acquiescence in the
present situation might well be taken as approval of the currently
accepted doctrine as enunciated in the case at bar. This need for
legislation has been recognized and adopted by an increasing number
of jurisdictions and probably indicates a developing trend in this
area of law.
In any event, the fact that some form of change is needed
becomes apparent from thoughtful reflection upon the nature of
punishment itself. While the purpose of punishment in primitive
societies may have been retribution directed at the criminal himself,
such a philosophy is inappropriate in a civilized society. Rather,
it should be the aim of society to rehabilitate the criminal, and to
deter other would-be wrongdoers from committing similar prohibited acts. A rule which denies a prisoner credit for time already
served under his original conviction, upon a second conviction for
the same crime, has no valid purpose in and of itself. The
application of this harsh doctrine results only in resentment of
society by men who are required, under the rule of the instant case,
to throw years, futilely spent in prisons, into the bottomless pit of
legal anachronism.

CRIMINAL PRETRIAL HEARING-EVIDENCE ADEVIDENCEAT PRETRIAL HEARING IN DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE IS
INVALID BASIS FOR CONVICTION. - On an indictment for a felony,
MITTED

a pretrial hearing was held in the absence of the defendant, at which
a motion was made to suppress evidence alleged to have been
illegally seized. No explanation was given for the defendant's
absence, but his counsel was present at the hearing and actively
advocated the defendant's position. The motion was denied, and
at the subsequent trial, the defendant and his codefendant were
convicted. In reversing both convictions, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a conviction based upon evidence ruled admissible

